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1    Introduction 
Many political and economic researchers devote a lot of attention to the phenomenon of 
corruption, by analyzing the main causes of corruption and developing tools and indicators to 
measure this phenomenon to better understand corruption and its appropriate treatment. 
Corruption is a deviation from human instinct (Shabbir and Anwar, 2007). According to 
Transparency International, corruption is defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money 
lost and the sector where it occurs”. Corruption appears in all sectors of the state, especially 
the government sector, which is called then "Administrative Corruption". 
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From the economic perspective, administrative corruption hinders development. The 
negative effects of administrative corruption include limiting the legitimacy of the 
Government because of the waste of vast amounts of resources such as time, paid bribes, the 
use of inefficient human resources through patronage, the use of resources that do not meet 
the required basic standards. Administrative corruption also involves high transaction costs 
and thus is an implicit tax. As a result, economic growth is being hampered, and it weakens 
competitiveness, because rights, services, and goods will favor the rich and the most powerful 
rather than the most efficient option. It also destroys moral values in society and increases 
social injustice which has negative impacts on social stability. 
Egypt suffers from a high level of administrative corruption, and this is illustrated by 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores that have ranged from 
28 to 37 over the period from 1998 to 2016. For the period 2012-2016, Egypt is ranked 108 
out of 176 countries. Administrative corruption has involved substantial tangible costs 
because of wasted resources, social unrest and injustice, which have already produced 
societal, political and economic repercussions. As a result, combating corruption is a high 
priority in Egypt.  
Recent studies have focused on identifying determinants of corruption and measuring their 
significance. Empirical studies haven't agreed on the determinants of corruption, and this is 
due to differences in the significance of determinants from one study to another depending on 
the independent variables used, and sometimes their significance is influenced by multi-
collinearity problem between variables or simultaneity problem. Corruption indices that are 
being used in these studies are derived from the respondents ' perception of corruption and 
hence don't reflect the real level of corruption. 
Economic experiments have become a trendy methodology in recent studies whether using 
direct response method or strategy method.  This new methodology is relied on in policy-
making; experimenting with the application of a particular policy to anticipate 
the  reaction of the citizen.  
It is also used with the costly trial-and-error approach, in addition to its ability to identify 
the phenomenon of corruption (Armantier and Boly, 2008). In this context, the use of 
economic experiments has expanded to analyze the corruption phenomenon. Hence, 
the economic experiments are used to control the environment surrounding participants and 
their characteristics to come out with results that reflect the reality of human behavior, 
besides several other benefits  mentioned through the study (Abbink and Monash, 2012), such 
as: 
 
− The ease of observing the person’s behavior in a simulated environment where 
corruption is being practiced. 
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− Analysis of the reaction of the participants - whatever roles they play -  to various 
incentives to determine the most efficient anti-corruption methods. 
− Eliminating the causality problem through a controlled environment. 
− Cost-effectiveness of economic experiments. However, it's unnecessary that their 
results are valid when they are applied on the ground (Croson, 2003). 
 
According to previous studies, wages are an effective tool for combating corruption. The 
inverse correlation between corruption and wage level is due to several reasons: higher wages 
make administrative positions more attractive relative to the private sector.  In addition, 
higher wages increase the moral cost of corruption and reduce incentives for corrupt acts 
since wages are fairer in that case (Veldhuizen, 2013). And the study of (Abbink, 2002) added 
that low wages, on the contrary, attract dishonest employees. Abbink and Wu (2017), 
examine the efficiency of offering rewards for self-reports as a way of fighting bribery. 
In this context, some previous studies use an empirical approach and adopt economic 
experiments, especially the direct response method, and investigate the impact of different 
wage levels on corruption. However, they do not use the strategy approach. Hence the main 
contribution of this study to previous literature is to use the strategy method to identify the 
extent to which a country can combat administrative corruption by raising the level of 
governmental wages, and whether institutional controls are crucial for that tool to reach its 
full effectiveness. This study will analyze the impact of wage levels on the rate of acceptance 
of bribery (a proxy for corruption), with absent institutional controls (zero conviction rate) 
and with present institutional controls (0.3% conviction rate), using the strategy method. 
This paper is divided into six sections. Section two covers the literature review, and 
section three presents the description of the bribery experiment. Afterward, the experimental 
design and procedures are illustrated in section four followed by the results in section five. 
Section six concludes. 
2    Literature Review 
Previous studies haven’t agreed on the direction of the effect of wages in the government 
sector on corruption level. Some studies supported the inverse relationship (consistent with 
the hypothesis of this paper) and yet did not agree on the ideal level of wages sufficient to 
combat corruption (Muttreja, 2012), (Le Rijckegham and Weder, 1997). They found out that 
wage increases would reduce the spread of corruption but would not be cost-effective. The 
study of Borcan et al (2012) also supported the inverse relationship between the two variables 
without addressing the cost-effectiveness of the policy, noting that the low wages in the 
Romanian government sector in 2010 has led to higher levels of corruption. In addition, the 
study of Esmaili et al. (2013) has shown that high wages can indirectly reduce the level of 
corruption by increasing the overall satisfaction with the job and through motivating the 
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employee who feels he is valued by the employer and thus less inclined to carry out corrupt 
practices. Schulze and Frank (2003) also conducted an experiment to explore the net effect of 
increasing monitoring on corruption while studying the impact of other factors on corruption 
such as level of pay in both treatments (zero and positive monitoring rates), and the results 
include that monitoring decreases overall corruption, and payment doesn’t reduce corruption 
in case of zero monitoring rate (no risk of being caught), while it does so in case of a positive 
monitoring rate. 
Schulze et al., (2013) found a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between the level of 
wages in the civil service and the level of perceived corruption. As the relative salary 
increases, corruption is reduced at low and medium levels of relative salary, up to a certain 
limit and then corruption increases. This relationship is consistent with the non-linear 
relationship between the wage level and the effort of the employee.  
Other studies , for example  Treisman (2000), reject the relationship because of the 
problem of endogeneity because higher wages can not only reduce corruption but also corrupt 
officials can use their influence and power to raise their wages as long as no effective means 
of control and punishment exist. 
Despite this difference in the direction of the relationship between corruption and wages, 
the studies agree that the magnitude and the direction of the impact of the wage level in the 
government sector on the level of corruption depend on some other factors such as 
institutional controls. For example, the results of Di Tella & Schargrodsky (2003) show that 
without sufficient control, higher relative wages will have a limited impact on reducing levels 
of corruption. 
Besides the previous studies that adopted the empirical methodology, there are other 
studies that have analyzed corruption using economic experiments method. For example, the 
study conducted by Veldhuizen (2013) used the direct response approach of the bribery 
experiment conducted by Abbink et al., (2002) to determine the relationship between 
corruption and the level of relative wages. It involved the participation of 76 people over four 
sessions in June 2010 and May 2011. Each session included 25 periods reflecting the long-
term relationship between the citizen and the public official. A conviction rate of 0.3% was 
used. The results showed that raising the sector wages leads to decreasing corruption levels; 
high wage employees accepted 38% of offered bribes on average, while low-wage employees 
accepted 91% of offered bribes. The same experiment was conducted with zero conviction 
rate to analyze the consequence of weakening the institutional controls on corruption level, 
and the result showed that conviction rate must be positive to have the pursued impact of 
increasing wages on reducing corruption levels. Friesenbichler et al. (2018) examine the 
experience of business leaders with government corruption. The authors analyze the factors 
that determine corruption; the factors related to the respondent i.e. work commitment and the 
previous experience with the corruption of the respondent.   
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The study of Jacquemet (2012) used direct response approach of bribery experiment, 
with the participation of 87 participants over four sessions, 25 periods each, and supported a 
strong positive correlation between the average level of transfers (Bribes) and the tendency of 
the employees to accept them. It also showed that the stronger and the more beneficial 
relationship between the employees and the citizens, the higher the employee’s tendency to 
accept bribes, while the stronger and the more beneficial relationship between the employees 
and their managers and the more wages are determined with fair criteria, the lower the 
employee’s tendency to accept bribes. These factors determine the direction of wages impact 
on corruption. While the study of (Abbink, 2002),based on direct response approach and 
participation of 24 participants with 30 periods in each session, showed that the stronger and 
the more beneficial relationship between the employees and the citizens, the higher the 
employee’s tendency to accept bribes like the previous study, but a negative relationship 
between wages and corruption was not supported. 
Regarding the external validity of the laboratory experiments tackling the corruption topic, 
Boly and Armantier (2012) argued their results are reliable and can be generalized because, 
despite the limited number of studies that examined corruption, their results don't differ 
significantly from field experiments. In that respect, this study compared several experimental 
studies and their correspondents in the field studies and results weren’t different in most of 
the compared studies. In addition, tArmantier and Boly (2008) conducted a field and 
laboratory experiments on bribes and found that, as wages increase, the employee’s tendency 
to accept bribes is reduced, and that enhances the external validity of the laboratory 
experiments on corruption. 
Some laboratory experiments were conducted to analyze other determinants of corruption 
using direct response approach, for example Drugov et al. (2014) which examined the impact 
of intermediaries on corruption levels, and accordingly it supported that intermediaries reduce 
the moral cost of corruption for citizens and employees and reduce the risk borne by both 
parties due to the lack of a direct connection between the two parties, and hence corruption 
increases. 
Kubbe and McBride (2015) analyzed the characteristics of corrupt people like gender, 
work experience, time spent away from the country of origin. The experiment included three 
parties: the citizen, the employee, and the punishment official, and it was found that offering 
bribes is higher within males compared to females, and it decreases as working experience 
and the number of years lived abroad are increased. 
Regarding the impact of cultural differences on corruption levels, Cameron et al., 
(2009) studied laboratory experiments in Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore to answer 
that question, and found that Indian participants accepted corruption more often than 
Australians and that is consistent with the corruption indices results, while Singapore showed 
higher tendencies to accept bribes than expected, and Indonesia showed lower tendencies than 
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expected. Also, Barr and Serra (2010) tested the impact of community values on corruption 
levels through a laboratory experiment on students in 2005 and repeating it on the same 
students in 2007 to determine the impact of staying within the British culture on their 
tendencies to be tolerant with corruption, and found tolerance was lowered in 2007 compared 
to 2005. 
It’s clear that previous studies that used the experimental methodology have relied on the 
direct response approach to study the impact of wages and other determinants on corruption, 
while the strategy method was not used in that context, so this paper will use the strategy 
method to determine the relationship between wages and corruption, and that how this paper 
will contribute to the literature. In addition, the strategy method provides researchers with the 
advantage of analyzing the participant’s reaction to many bribe levels and each action of the 
first player, so the participant’s strategy is clear and the lowest level of a bribe is determined. 
The direct response approach analyzes the decisions corresponding to one action of the first 
player, so experiments may end up without tackling certain nodes. However, the strategy 
method is criticized by providing a relative abstract environment in the decision-making 
process compared to the direct response method (Brandts and Charness, 2011). 
Regarding the ability to rely on the strategy method, Brandts and Charness 
(2011) analyzed several studies which compare the behavior by using the 
strategy method and the direct response method, and found that 16 of  29 studies showed no 
difference in results, while differences were found in four comparisons, and mixed results 
were found in the remaining 9 comparisons.  
3    Description of Bribery Experiment 
The current experiment studies the effect of different wage levels on the acceptance rate of 
bribery (a proxy of corruption level), in two cases: zero conviction rate (the 
absence of institutional controls), and 0.3% conviction rate. 
The experiment is based on two hypotheses: 
 
1. The higher the wage, the lower the employee's tendency to accept bribes, with high 
or low conviction rates. 
2. As conviction rates increase, reflecting more powerful institutional controls, an 
employee's tendency to accept bribes decreases with low or high wages.  
 
In this context, two treatments are used: one for low wages and the other for high wages, to 
determine whether wage levels affect the acceptance rate of bribes. Following Veldhuizen 
(2013), each of the two treatments is subject to zero and 0.3% conviction rates to analyze the 
impact of positive conviction rate on the level of corruption. 
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The main characteristics of the experiment are: 
 
− The currency used is the experimental point, and the conversion rate is 100 
experimental points for one EGP1; such that 1000 experimental points equal to 10 
EGP. 
− Each participant represents a public official in the experiment, and participants are 
low wage officials (receive a wage of 1200 experimental points) or high wage 
officials (receive a wage of 5000 experimental points). 
− Each participant receives a payoff at the end of the experiment equal to his wage as a 
public official plus an additional payment that depends on his/her decision in the 
experiment. 
− The wage group of each participant is randomly chosen, and they are notified of their 
wage group and wages received by the other group to include the relative wage factor 
in the experiment. 
− The experiment starts with an introduction notifying the participants they are public 
officials and the wage group they belong to. They are in charge of driver licensing 
and are asked to provide a license to a citizen who has not passed the driving test.2 
 
Two questions are imposed on the participant: 
 
1. Unconditional corruption: whether the participant will give the citizen his license, to 
measure the general tendency of corruption with no return (bribes). 
2. Conditional corruption:  10 levels of bribes will be provided (starting from 200 to 
2000 experimental points), and the participant must answer by ACCEPT/REJECT for 
each bribe level for granting the citizen his license. 
 
The participant is informed that the experiment application will choose randomly ONE bribe 
level and the participant additional payment will be calculated according to his/her response 
by ACCEPT or REJECT on the randomly chosen bribe level, so that the participant will think 
about each bribe level that will affect his payoff. If the bribe level chosen by the experiment 
application corresponds to REJECT, the payoff will be his wage, and the experiment ends 
with a questionnaire. If the bribe level chosen by the experiment corresponds to an ACCEPT, 
the payoff will be his wage plus the bribe level, and the experiment ends with a questionnaire, 
and this is for zero conviction rate groups. 
                                                 
1  1 US Dollar = 17.65 EGP (According to Egyptian Central bank, October 2017). 
2 All instructions are illustrated in Appendix 1.   
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For 0.3% conviction rate groups, participants are informed that there is a probability of 
0.3% that the bribe is discovered and the total payoff is lost, so if the bribe level chosen by the 
experiment application corresponds to an ACCEPT, the experiment application will randomly 
choose a number from 0 to 999, if the chosen number is 0 or 1 or 2, all payoff is lost including 
the wage and the experiment ends with a questionnaire. If the chosen number for example, is 
4, 5 or 998, 999 the payoff is preserved as the bribe is not discovered and the experiment ends 
with a questionnaire.3 
4    Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment included the participation of 120 participants, who are divided among four 
groups: L0 low wage group with zero conviction rate, L3 low wage group with 0.3% 
conviction rate, H0 high wage group with zero conviction rate, H3 high wage group with 
0.3% conviction rate. Each group included 30 participants. 
Students were mainly targeted in the experiment and the sample breaks down as shown in 
the table (1) 
Table 1: Breakdown of the sample  
Gender Males 55% 
Females  45% 
Age Less than 26 years old 81% 
with an average age 20.46 years old  
26 years old or older 19% 
Profession Students or fresh graduates 61% 
Employees 39% 
76.6% of which work in the private sector and 
23.4% work in the public sector 
Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
The participants' fields of study vary; they include economics, political science, engineering, 
computer engineering, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, business, law, and languages and 
translation. 
                                                 
3 Appendices 2 and 3 show screenshots from the experiment related to the two questions and 
the notes previously described corresponding to different groups to which the participants 
belong. 
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Regarding the experiment application, a computer programmer was assigned to develop a 
webpage with the needed specifications of the experiment such as the random selection of 
bribe levels. The participants register through a web link and it takes 5 to 10 minutes to finish 
the experiment. The experiment was conducted in the period 1-9 October 2017,  
Regarding the compensation, it varied from 14.3 EGP on average for the L3 group to 14.5 
EGP for L0 group, and from 51.8 EGP on average for H0 group to 53.3 EGP for H3 group. 
The experiment was introduced in Arabic and in English, and it used loaded language that 
reflects corruption to add reality to the experiment since it was answered online, and 
especially that the study Abbink, K. & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2006) supported no significant 
difference in results in case of using neutral language (transfer, player 1, etc.) or loaded 
language (bribe, public official, etc.) through conducting an economic experiment on 
corruption. 
The experiment starts with demographic questions, instructions, decision making 
questions, and ends up with a questionnaire to determine the participants’ opinions about the 
reasons for making or not making corruption decisions. 
5    Results 
The registration in the experiment required the name, the email, and the phone number of 
each participant. Then due to the sensitivity of the experiment’s topic, it was suggested to 
enable participants to register with the phone number only, so they could make whatever 
decisions anonymously without the fear of being known by the researcher. In that regard, the 
registration process was changed starting from the 32nd participant.  
Hence, this section presents the analysis of the whole sample results (120 participants) 
followed by the analysis of the 89- participant sample results after changing the registration 
requirements (the sample after excluding the first 31 participants). The questionnaire results 
will be presented in Appendix 4. 
The analysis includes comparisons of acceptance rates of bribes among different groups to 
test the two hypotheses: 
 
1. As wages increase, the public official has a lower tendency to accept bribes in case of 
zero or positive conviction rates, and that includes comparisons of acceptance rates 
of bribes between L0 and H0 groups, and between L3 and H3groups. 
2. As conviction rate increases, the public official has lower tendency to accept bribes 
in case of high or low wages, and that includes comparisons of acceptance rates of 
bribes between L0 and L3groups, and between H0 and H3groups. 
 
Afterward, a chi-square test will test the significance and the reliability of the comparisons' 
results, by calculating the p-values and comparing them to a 5% significance level. 
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From the sample, it was found out that six participants accepted only one random 
bribe level which is not the highest bribe level. This behavior contradicts with the 
rational human behavior that implies accepting any bribe level and the subsequent 
ones until the highest level (2000 experimental points in this case). Hence one 
interpretation is that these participants misunderstood the experiment. For the 
analysis, it was assumed that they accepted also all bribe levels greater than the 
one they chose. 
First: The whole sample 
Figure (1) shows the acceptance rate of unconditional corruption: 12.5% of the 
sample accepted corruption (i.e., granted the driver’s license) without taking 
bribes. Also, the figure shows the acceptance rate of each level of bribe according 
to the participants’ answers to the second question, which varies from 11.7% at 
200, 400, and 600 experimental points and increases till it reaches 31.7% at 2000 
experimental points. Meanwhile, 68.3% of the sample did not accept bribes. 
Figure 1:  Acceptance rate of conditional and unconditional corruption in the total sample 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment.  
Despite the low acceptance rate at all bribe levels,  the figure shows that the rates increase 
with increased bribe levels, and table (2) shows the strong positive correlation between the 
level of bribes and their acceptance rates in the 4 groups, represented by the Spearman 
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correlation coefficient, and that result is consistent with the one of the study concerning the 
positive correlation between the two variables (Jacquemet N., 2012). 
Table 2: Spearman correlation coefficient between the levels of bribes and their 
acceptance rates in the groups 
ρ L0 L3 H0 H3 0.972727 0.966667 0.957576 0.981818 
Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Figure (2) shows that the percentage of those who did not accept a bribe is lower for L0 
group (73.3%) than H0 group (76.7%) and also lower for the L3 group (60%) than H0 group 
(63.3%) which supports the first hypothesis. It is also clear that the percentage of 
those who accepted no bribe is lower in case of 0.3% conviction rate compared to zero 
conviction rate whether among the high wage groups or low wage groups, and that doesn’t 
support the second hypothesis that higher conviction rates imply lower acceptance rates of 
bribes. Differences in results are suggested to be due to differences in a participant's 
preferences.  
Figure 2: Comparison of the percentages of those who accepted no bribes among the four 
groups 
 
Source:  based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
 
As for the acceptance rates at each bribe level through the answers to the second 
question, figure(3) shows that the acceptance rates are equal along the first 4 
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levels of bribes in groups L0 and H0, and for the other bribe levels, L0 acceptance 
rates are higher which supports the first hypothesis. Most rates are equal or higher 
for H3 group compared to L3 group (except for the last bribe level where L3 is 
higher than H3) which doesn’t support the first hypothesis as shown in figure (4). 
Figure 3: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups L0 and H0 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Figure 4: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups L3 and H3 
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Figures (5) and (6) show that the acceptance rate of all bribe levels are higher for groups of 
0.3% conviction rate compared to zero conviction rate for high wage groups and low wage 
groups (except for 1200 bribe level among the low wage groups), and that doesn’t support the 
second hypothesis.   
Figure 5: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups L0 and L3 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Figure 6: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups H0 and H3 
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Table 3: P-value for comparisons between L0 and L3, L0 and H0, H0 and H3, and L3 and H3 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
In the framework of these findings, table (3) shows the p-values calculated based on chi-
square test to determine the significance of the previous comparisons’ results, either between 
L0 and L3, or L0 and H0, or H0 and H3, or L3 and H3. 
It’s clear from the previous table that all p-values are higher than the significance level of 
5%, except for the bribe levels 200-400 in the L0/L3 comparison, and the bribe levels 200-
400, 1400, and 1600 in the H0/H3 comparison, as the differences are significant at the 10% 
significance level, but all differences represented in the previous figures are not significant, 
hence the two hypotheses are not supported. 
The following part will conduct the same analysis, but the first hypothesis will be tested 
after combining L0 and L3 in one group “L” and combining H0 and H3 in one group “H”, 
and that is based on the previous results of the unsupported second hypothesis that different 
conviction rates affect corruption level. The second hypothesis will be tested after combining 
L0 and H0 in one group “0%” and combining L3 and H3 in one group "0.3%" based on the 
previous results of the unsupported first hypothesis that different wage levels affect 
corruption level.  
In that context, figure (7) shows that the percentage of those who accepted no bribes are 
lower in low wage group L (66.7%) compared to high wage group H (70%) supporting the 
first hypothesis. On the other hand, the percentage is higher in the zero conviction rate group 
(75%) than the 0.3% conviction rate group (61.7%), and this doesn’t support the second 
hypothesis. 
P-value: L0/L3 P-value: H0/H3 P-value: L0/H0 P-value: L3/H3 
200-400 0.088** 200-400 0.087975** 200-600 1 200 1 
600-800 0.168 600-800 0.107123 800-1000 0.56954158 400 1 
1000 0.739 1000 0.165857 1200 0.16585666 600 1 
1200 0.754 1200 0.165857 1400 0.16585666 800 0.738649 
1400 0.766 1400 0.095274** 1600 0.196705602 1000 0.754001 
1600 0.774 1600 0.06704** 1800 0.347163802 1200 0.754001 
1800 0.573 1800 0.136037 2000 0.765594484 1400 1 
2000 0.273 2000 0.259796 Accepted no bribes 0.765594484 1600 0.781375 
Accepted 
no bribes 0.273 
Accepted no 
bribes 0.259796 1800 1 
2000 0.790602 
Accepted no 
bribes 0.790602 
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Figure7: Comparison of the percentages of those who accepted no bribes among the four 
groups 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
As for the acceptance rates at each bribe level, higher rates are observed for L 
group compared to H group and that supports the first hypothesis (except for 200 
through 800 bribe levels which show either equal rates or higher for H group), as 
shown in figure (8). 
Figure 8: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two groups L and H 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
66.7% 70.0%
75.0%
61.7%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
L H 0% 0.3%
Didn't accept any bribes
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
L
H
Review of Economic Analysis 10 (2018) 409-447 
 424
Figure 9: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups 0% and 0.3% 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Figure (9) shows also higher acceptance rates for 0.3% group compared to 0% group, thus not 
supporting the second hypothesis. 
According to these findings, table (4) shows the p-values calculated based on chi-square 
test to determine the significance of the previous comparisons’ results, either between L and 
H groups or between 0% and 0.3% groups to determine the reliability of the previous results. 
Table 4: P-value for comparisons between L and H and between 0% and 0.3% groups 
P-value 
  L/H 0%/0.3% 
200 1 0.087975**
400 1 0.087975**
600 1 0.087975**
800 0.793486 0.190557 
1000 0.810136 0.229654 
1200 0.486576 0.486576 
1400 0.375435 0.18368 
1600 0.53154 0.144327 
1800 0.539657 0.1524 
2000 0.694701 0.11643 
Didn't accept any bribes 0.694701 0.270166 
Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
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It’s clear from table (4) that all p-values are higher than significance level of 5%, implying 
that all differences represented in the previous figures (7, 8, and 9) are not significant, except 
for the bribe levels 200 through 600 in 0%/0.3% comparison which show significance at 10% 
significance level, hence the two hypotheses are not supported even after combining L0 and 
L3 in one group “L” and combining H0 and H3 in one group “H” based on the first results of 
rejected second hypothesis that different conviction rates affect corruption level, and after 
combining L0 and H0 in one group “0%” and combining L3 and H3 in one group “0.3%” 
based on the first results of rejected first hypothesis that different wage levels affect 
corruption level.  
The following section compares between the whole sample and the sample excluding the 
responses of the first 31 participants. The name and e-mail were removed as registration 
requirements starting from the 32ndparticipant so that participants are encouraged to make 
their decisions with no sensitivity, especially that the acceptance rates of bribes are higher 
after excluding the first 31 participants. All analysis is conducted for the 89- participant 
sample as shown in the following section. 
Second: The sample after excluding the first 31 participants 
This sample comprises 89 participants. Each of the groups L3, H0 and H3 has 22 participants, 
while L0 group includes 23 participants. Figure (10) compares the acceptance rate of 
conditional and unconditional corruption between the whole sample and the sample after 
excluding the first 31 participants. The acceptance rates for unconditional corruption and for 
each bribe level are higher in the sample with 89 participants compared to the whole sample. 
While percentages of not accepting any bribes are higher for the whole sample compared to 
the sample with 89 participants. That shows that decisions are affected by the disclosure of 
the identity and corruption decisions are made more freely, and that fact is an open question 
that needs to be studied by future experiments. 
For the smaller sample, the acceptance rate of unconditional corruption is equal to 
15.73%. The rates of acceptance of each bribe level according to the responses of the second 
question are 14.6% at 200, 400 and 600, and gradually increase to reach 37.1% at 2000 bribe 
level, and 62.9% of the smaller sample accepted no bribes. Although the acceptance rates are 
low at all levels, the figure also shows higher acceptance rates corresponding to higher bribe 
levels, which is the same as for the whole sample. 
Figure (11) shows that the percentage of those who accepted no bribes is higher in low 
wage groups than high wage groups whether at zero or 0.3% conviction rates, thus supporting 
the first hypothesis. It is also clear that the percentage of those who accepted no bribe is lower 
in case of 0.3% conviction rate compared to zero conviction rate whether among the high 
wage groups or low wage groups, thus not supporting the second hypothesis that higher 
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conviction rates implies lower acceptance rates of bribes, and these are the same results as for 
the whole sample. 
Figure 10: Comparison between the 120 and 89 participants samples regarding the 
acceptance rates of conditional and unconditional corruption  
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Figure 11: Comparison of the percentages of those who accepted no 
bribes among the four groups 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
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As for the acceptance rates at each bribe level through the answers to the second question, 
figure (12) shows that the acceptance rates are lower in L0 than H0 for the first 5 levels of 
bribes and the last one, and higher in L0 than H0 for the following levels of bribes revealing 
mixed results. All rates are equal or higher for H3 group than the L3 group which doesn’t 
support the first hypothesis as shown in figure (13). 
Figure 12: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups L0 and H0 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Figure 13: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups L3 and H3 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
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Figures (14) and (15) show that the acceptance rate of all bribe levels is higher for groups of 
0.3% conviction rate compared to zero conviction rate for high wage groups and low wage 
groups, thus not supporting the second hypothesis.   
Figure 14: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups L0 and L3 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
 
Figure 15: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups H0 and H3 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
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In the framework of these findings, table (5) shows the p-values calculated based on chi-
square test to determine the significance of the previous comparisons’ results, either between 
L0 and L3, or L0 and H0, or H0 and H3, or L3 and H3. 
Table 5:  P-value for comparisons between L0 and L3, L0 and H0, H0 and H3, and L3 
and H3 
P-value: L0/L3 P-value: H0/H3 P-value: L0/H0 P-value: L3/H3 
200-400 0.010347* 200-400 0.08034** 200-800 0.230103 200 1 
600-800 0.028807* 600-800 0.09725** 1000-1200 0.623205 400 1 
1000-1200 0.259679 1000 0.15016 1400-1600 0.342663 600 1 
1400 0.444699 1200 0.15016 1800 0.793208 800 0.727724
1600 0.456652 1400 0.08172** 2000 0.928354 1000 0.741078
1800 0.456652 1600 0.05214** Accepted no bribes 0.928354 1200 0.741078
2000 0.174862 1800 0.11179 1400 0.750455
Accepted no 
bribes 0.174862 2000 0.12161   1600 0.539715
Accepted no bribes 0.12161 1800 0.539715
2000 0.762787
      
Accepted no 
bribes 0.762787
Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
It's clear from the table (5) that, all p-values are higher than the significance level of 5%, 
except for the bribe levels 200-800 in the L0/L3 comparison. Also, differences in percentages 
in H0/H3 are significant at the 10% significance level for bribe levels 200-800 and 1400-
1600, which rejects the second hypothesis. And by taking all these results under 
consideration, differences represented in the previous figures are insignificant; hence the two 
hypotheses are not supported. 
As done within the whole sample analysis, the following part will conduct the same 
analysis, but the first hypothesis will be tested after combining L0 and L3 in one group "L" 
and combining H0 and H3 in one group "H", and that is based on the previous results of 
rejected second hypothesis that different conviction rates affect corruption level. While the 
second hypothesis will be tested after combining L0 and H0 in one group "0%" and 
combining L3 and H3 in one group "0.3%" based on the previous results of the rejected first 
hypothesis that different wage levels affect corruption level.   
In that context, figure (16) shows that the percentage of those who didn’t accept any bribes 
are higher in low wage group L (64.4%) compared to high wage group H (61.4%), and it’s 
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also higher in the zero conviction rate group (73.3%) than the 0.3% conviction rate group 
(52.3%). This implies a contradiction with both hypotheses. 
As for the acceptance rates at each bribe level, higher rates are observed for H group 
compared to L group (except for 1200and1400 bribe levels which show higher rates for L 
group) and that still doesn’t support the first hypothesis, as shown in figure (17) 
 
Figure 16: Comparison of the percentages of those who accepted no 
bribes among the four groups 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Figure 17: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups L and H 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
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Figure (18) shows also higher acceptance rates for 0.3% group compared to 0% group, thus 
not supporting the second hypothesis. 
According to these findings, table (6) shows the p-values calculated based on chi-square 
test to determine the significance of the previous comparisons’ results, either between L and 
H groups or between 0% and 0.3% groups to determine the reliability of the previous results 
Figure 18: Comparison of acceptance rates of bribes at each level in the two 
groups 0% and 0.3% 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the economic experiment. 
Table 6: P-value for comparisons between L and H and between 0% and 0.3% groups 
P-value 
  L/H 0%/0.3% 
200 0.730849 0.031959* 
400 0.730849 0.031959* 
600 0.730849 0.031959* 
800 0.547344 0.088012**
1000 0.753576 0.062023**
1200 0.848717 0.191132 
1400 0.857488 0.078809**
1600 0.942745 0.057682**
1800 0.764273 0.097533**
2000 0.763534 0.039726* 
Didn't accept any bribes 0.763534 0.039726* 
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Table (6) demonstrates that, all p-values are higher than significance level of 5% for the L/H 
comparison, implying that all differences represented in the previous figures (7 and 8) are not 
significant, hence the first hypothesis is rejected even after combining L0 and L3 in one group 
“L” and combining H0 and H3 in one group “H” based on the first results of rejected second 
hypothesis that different conviction rates affect corruption level. Most p-values are lower than 
5% or 10% significance levels, thus supporting figure 9; higher acceptance rates for 0.3% 
group compared to 0% group, and that’s after combining L0 and H0 in one group “0%” and 
combining L3 and H3 in one group “0.3%” based on the first results of rejected first 
hypothesis that different wage levels affect corruption level. This result shows that higher 
conviction rates lead to a higher corruption level.  
It is clear from the previous section, for the whole sample analysis, and for the smaller 
sample, there is a high rate of non-acceptance of any bribe in the four groups. The previous 
results also show that the levels of acceptance of the levels of bribery between the four groups 
are close, despite the large difference between the wages of groups L0 and H0 and between 
these groups L3 and H3. As for the second hypothesis, the conviction rate of 0.3% used by 
the previous economic experiments may be low when used in the Egyptian example, although 
the high cost in case of conviction which leads to dismissal of the public official and losing all 
his/her payoff may matter. But the results implied that this low conviction rate that is not 
enough to deter corrupt acts because the return from bribes are higher for those who accepted 
at least one bribe level in the two groups L3 and H3, so the decisions made are probably 
based on the participants’ preferences, norms, and behaviors regardless of the conviction 
rates. 
6    Conclusion 
Recent studies have relied on economic experiments either by using the direct response 
method or the strategy method because of the limitations of empirical studies to reflect reality. 
Economic experiments depend on controlling the environment surrounding the participants 
and their characteristics to draw conclusions close to the real human behavior, besides other 
advantages that were mentioned earlier. 
In this context, some previous studies that adopted economic experiments approach were 
presented, especially the direct response method, and we studied the impact of different wage 
levels on corruption. However, it was found that the strategy approach was not used. Thus, 
this paper depended on analyzing the impact of wage levels on the rate of acceptance of 
bribery (a proxy for corruption), with absent institutional controls (zero conviction rate) and 
with present institutional controls (0.3% conviction rate), using the strategy method. 
The results section started with a full sample analysis of 120 participants. A chi-square test 
was used, and it showed that different acceptance rates of each bribe level among different 
groups were insignificant, thus rejecting the two hypotheses and that is similar to results of 
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some previous studies. Based on these findings, the same analysis was conducted again, after 
combining groups of the same wage together to test the first hypothesis, and groups with the 
same conviction rates together to test the second hypothesis. The results were insignificant as 
well. 
Then, a comparison was made between the full sample of the 120 participants and the 
sample after excluding responses of the first 31 participants (the 31 participants were not 
anonymous in contrast to the following 89 participants). The acceptance rates of all bribe 
levels were higher in the smaller sample (89 participants) compared with the full sample (120 
participants), reflecting the impact of anonymity on the corruption level which is still an open 
question that needs to be analyzed in further studies.  
The same analysis was conducted for the smaller sample and most results rejected the two 
hypotheses, and combination of groups was redone for the smaller sample and the results 
were not supporting the first hypothesis, but for the second hypothesis the results showed that 
higher conviction rates lead to a higher corruption level, which is against the rational human 
behavior. This finding was similar to that found by the study (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), 
where an experiment was conducted to test the impact of imposing fines on parents who come 
late to pick up their children from daycare centers in Israel. The latter study found out higher 
late pickups after imposing that fine, and the authors suggested some reasons for that. First, 
the fine wasn’t severe enough such that parents could tolerate it, and no other worse 
punishments were expected. Second, the fine reshaped the parents' perceptions of the daycare 
centers. At first, many parents knew late pickups caused a generous teacher to stay after the 
normal working hours free of charge, so they tried not to abuse that fact. When fines were 
imposed, late pickups turned out to be a service with an affordable price (the fine), so they 
bought that service as much as needed and the internal motivation to come early was 
suppressed. The second explanation is supported by the study (Frey and Jegen, 2000) which 
explained that under certain conditions the monetary incentive may suppress the intrinsic 
motivation to do the right thing which is known as the “Crowding out effect”. Hence, as long 
as the punishment is not high enough compared to the return, the deed subject to the 
punishment won’t be deterred.  In the context of the current study, conviction rates that are 
high enough are required to deter corruption, otherwise, low conviction rates will increase 
corruption as shown from the experiment’s results. 
Finally, regarding the insignificance of the experiment results, several reasons have been 
suggested, which can be considered as limitations of the current study, such as: 
 
− The strategy approach does not allow the participant to repeat the experiment more 
than once as with direct response experiments, so the answers may not stem from a 
full understanding of the experiment. 
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− The inability of the participants to put themselves in the shoes of the public officials 
due to the absence of some factors that add realism, such as the absence of the role of 
the citizen / provider of bribery and relying on the website to do his role by choosing 
randomly a bribe level, which reduces the realism of the experiment. In addition, 
externalities didn’t have tangible impacts in the experiment; they were only referred 
to through the introduction for the participant to take them into account. 
− One of the common norms in the Egyptian community is to judge and criticize one 
another, so it is possible that some participants refused bribes fearing being criticized 
or judged by the researcher. 
− 80% of the sample represents the ages between 18 and 25 years old, the generation 
that witnessed the revolution of 25th of January and believed in the values of justice 
and the fight against corruption; which may have induced participants not to accept 
bribes. 
− Financial constraints led to recruiting small sample size (120 participants) and 
offering low financial compensations, which may not be considered as sufficient 
incentives to conduct the experiment and answer honestly. In addition, bribe levels 
were relatively low with respect to wages, and this was evidenced by 24% of the 
participants who chose the low bribe levels as the reason they are rejected, according 
to question five in the questionnaire, so this finding may be related to the low 
acceptance rate of bribes in the current experiment. However, it is necessary to point 
out that some economic experiments show that there is no difference between the 
results of experiments that rely on small or large financial incentives (Croson, 2003). 
− Dependence on low conviction rate (0.3%) used by previous economic experiments 
may not be sufficient when applied in the Egyptian example. The cost of conviction 
is significant and reflected by the dismissal of the public official and losing all 
payoff. However, this is not enough to deter corruption because the return on bribery 
is greater than the risk of losing all, and this finding is for those who have accepted at 
least one bribe level in L3 and H3 groups, so decisions are based on the participant's 
own behavior, values, and principles. So the robustness of the experiment's results in 
higher conviction rates is still an open research question. 
 
Therefore, to enhance the subsequent experiments, it is recommended to conduct the 
following experiments in the laboratory using the strategy method so that other researchers 
can easily recruit participants to play the different roles in the corruption process such as the 
citizen, the public official, and the punishment official. It is also suggested to add other 
factors that increase the realism of the experiment, especially the externalities. It is of equal 
importance to find a sponsor to have sufficient funding to increase the size of the sample, 
raise the financial compensation, and raise the levels of bribes provided. It is also 
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recommended raise the conviction rate used in the experiment to test the impact of higher 
conviction rates on corruption levels. Furthermore, it is suggested to assign participants from 
different age groups and various social and financial classes to the experiment, thus providing 
the researcher with a heterogeneous sample with different characteristics, and therefore the 
answers may be different because of different sample backgrounds, which will simulate more 
accurately the reality of Egyptian society. Finally, and according to the experiment’s finding, 
the impact of anonymity on corruption level may be further studied. 
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Appendix 1: Instruction provided in the experiment 
• You are now taking part in an economics experiment.  
• The currency of the experiment is the experimental point. At the end of the 
experiment, all points you earned will be converted into EGP at a rate of 
100 points per EGP, such that 1000 points are worth 10 EGP.  
• In this experiment there are two types of public officials: 
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- Low wage public officials with wage 1200 points  
- High wage public officials with wage 5000 points  
• Your type is randomly chosen. 
• You will receive a payment at the end of the experiment equal to your 
wage besides extra payment that depends on your decisions as illustrated 
in the experiment.  
• To receive your payment, please select the most convenient way: 
- Vodafone cash  
- Face-to-face meeting 
Appendix 2: screenshots from L0 experiment 
Screenshot 1: Introduction about the participant and the first question 
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Screenshots 2 & 3: the second question 
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Screenshot 4: Important notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of Economic Analysis 10 (2018) 409-447 
 440
Appendix 3: screenshots from H3 experiment 
Screenshot 1: Introduction about the participant and the first question 
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Screenshot 2: Important notes 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire results 
Participants were asked to answer a questionnaire of 8 questions after completing the 
experiment, and this questionnaire is taken from the study of (Kubbe, Ina, & McBride, 
Michael T., 2015), and it aims at identifying  participants' views on the causes and deterrents 
of corruption from the point of view citizen, employee and punishment official. The following 
section addresses the results of the answers as follows. 
Question 1: Have you heard of corruption incidents? If yes, provide details. 
64% of the participants have heard of corruption incidents, and they provided examples such 
as: 
− Issuing driving licenses without passing a driving test. 
− Paying bribes to get jobs at the government or to have undue privileges, such as tests 
answers, or to avoid punishment. 
− Stalling in finishing governmental procedures in case no bribes are paid. 
− Money laundering and unfair price increases on consumers. 
− Corruption of public sector employees, police, judiciary, and political people. 
− Misuse of influence, power, and nepotism when hiring acquaintances and friends. 
− The famous scandal of contaminated blood. 
− Corruption in hospitals along with other examples mentioned by the participants. 
Question 2: Have you been involved in a corruption incident? If yes, provide details. 
23% of the sample was exposed to corruption, and this percentage is not small considering 
that the average age of most participants doesn't exceed 21 years old. These incidents include 
several examples as referred by the participants: 
− Finishing governmental procedures for driving licenses and pre-marital medical 
examinations. 
− Non-compliance with official working hours. 
− Paying bribes to get rid of traffic penalties and to avoid punishment in general. 
− Lacking access to services due to refusal to pay bribes, especially for driving 
licenses. 
− Giving priorities to bribe payers or powerful people when providing government 
services. 
− A participant's relative was infected with hepatitis C because of the transfusion of 
blood from contaminated blood bags, along with other incidents mentioned by the 
participants. 
The next six questions are multiple-choice questions, and participants must choose at least 
one answer for each question. 
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Question 3: Why do you think some citizens don’t give bribes?  
Figure (19) illustrates that 77% of the sample believes that ethics are the strongest deterrent to 
corruption. The other reasons are close in percentages i.e. 41% of the sample chose the fear of 
punishment, 47% combated corruption, 43% chose it is unnecessary to make a bribe to get the 
service, while 39% of the sample justified that due to costs. Among other reasons, 5% of the 
participants added that this is against the interest of the state, or because they do not know 
how to give bribes without getting discovered, besides religious reasons. 
Figure 19: The third question 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the questionnaire answers. 
Question 4: Why do you think some citizens are giving bribes? 
In Figure(20), it’s clear that 72% of the participants explained that the biggest cause of 
corruption of citizens is to gain profits, while 18% achieved the interests of the state such as 
raising the wages of citizens and fighting unemployment is the motive of bribing, and 24% 
mentioned other reasons such as facilitating procedures, saving time and effort, getting 
services that are not accomplished without paying bribes, unjustly obtaining services or 
avoiding punishment, and preferring personal interests to the public interest. All these reasons 
revolve around the concept of gaining profits. 
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Figure 20: The fourth question 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the questionnaire answers. 
Question 5: Why do you think some public officials do not accept bribes? 
Figure (21) shows that the biggest deterrent for bribe-taking is ethics and fear of 
punishment with percentages 70% and 68% respectively, while 40% of the participants 
combated corruption reason, 41% to achieve justice, and 24% because of the low bribe levels. 
The latest result may justify the low acceptance of bribes in the current experiment. Finally, 
5% of the participants added religious reasons, founding a system in the country, and because 
part of their jobs is to provide services with no extra return as bribes. 
Figure 21: The fifth question 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the questionnaire answers. 
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Question 6: Why do you think some public officials accept bribes? 
The percentages are close in explaining the reasons for the acceptance of bribes from the 
point of view of the public official as shown in Figure (22). The reason for the low level of 
wages gained 77% of the participants' opinion, 71% to gain profits, and 63% thought 
inequality in the distribution of wages and wealth in the country is the reason. These results 
give importance to improving the level of wages in the government sector in the state and 
achieving justice in the distribution of wealth. Also, from other reasons added by 4% of the 
participants are being greedy and seeking personal interests at the expense of public interest 
and low morals, especially for those with high wages and those reasons revolve also within 
the framework of the realization of the personal interests. 
Figure 22: The sixth Question 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the questionnaire answers. 
The seventh and eighth questions are imposed to identify the causes and deterrents of 
corruption among the punishment officials as follows. 
Question 7: Why do you think some corruption acts are punished?  
72%, 64%, and 33% of respondents showed that the imposing punishment was due to the 
desire to combat corruption, achieve justice and ethical reasons, respectively, as shown in 
figure (23). Among the other reasons mentioned by 13% of the sample is the lack of 
distribution of the benefits of corrupt practices with the punishment officials or other 
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stakeholders. Penalties are implemented to achieve certain interests and not to achieve justice 
and considering it as a random process that applies to the weak (less powerful). Also, this 
process aims at revealing some false propaganda that justice is being achieved and corruption 
is being combated, even though corruption is not being combated, so that public opinion is 
suppressed, and estimates of indicators are maintained at levels that do not affect the local 
economy and the investment market. These opinions show the mistrust of the public in the 
punishment system and institutional controls in the country. 
Figure 23: The seventh question 
 
Source: Based on the data derived from the questionnaire answers. 
Question 8: Why do you think there is no appropriate punishment for all the 
corruption acts? 
The inefficiency of punishment systems in the country and the difficulty of their 
development are at the forefront of the reasons, as explained by 86% and 51% of the 
participants, respectively, in figure (24). While 28% said the reason is the misconduct of the 
officials of punishment to do their jobs and their desire to gain profits from corrupt practices. 
The reason for the need for bribery to achieve justice, for example, was considered as the 
weakest reason for the absence of punishment for all corruption acts. 
Other reasons that 8% of the participants added included the corruption of the punishment 
officials themselves and the stakeholders. Therefore, it is not in their interest to reach out an 
efficient system of punishment, in addition to the small size of entities responsible for 
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auditing and controlling government agencies, and the high cost of implementing an effective 
system of punishment.  
Figure 24: The eighth question 
 
Source:  Based on the data derived from the questionnaire answers. 
It is clear from the above that the most important results of the questionnaire are the 
prevalence of corruption, as 64% of the sample heard of corruption incidents, and 23% were 
exposed to corruption. Ethics, the desire to combat corruption, and the fear of punishment are 
one of the biggest deterrents of corruption, whether for citizens, public officials or 
punishment officials. This provides an indicator of the need to spread the culture of anti-
corruption and the preservation of the rights of others along with developing a system of 
punishment to be deterrent and effective in combating corruption. 
From the participants perspectives, the biggest reasons for offering bribes is to gain 
profits, facilitate procedures, save time and effort, and have access to services that are not 
done without paying bribes, and that implies the urgency of improving the governmental 
services and depending more on technology to facilitate the procedures and limit the direct 
connection of citizens with public officials. 
The most important result is that one of the biggest reasons for the acceptance of bribes is 
the low level of wages and inequality in the distribution of wages and wealth in the country, 
which shows the importance of giving priority to improving justice and increasing the level of 
wages in the governmental sector in the state. Moreover, the role of punishment system is 
crucial.  
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